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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the socially optimal allocation by focusing not on the social welfare 
function but instead on the utility possibility frontier in exogenous growth models with a 
heterogeneous population. A unique balanced growth path was found on which all of the 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are equally and indefinitely satisfied 
(sustainable heterogeneity). With appropriate government interventions, such a path is always 
achievable and is uniquely socially optimal for almost all generally usable (i.e., preferences are 
complete, transitive, and continuous) social welfare functions. The only exceptions are some 
variants in Nietzsche type social welfare functions, but those types of welfare functions will 
rarely be adopted in democratic societies. This result indicates that it is no longer necessary to 
specify the shape of the social welfare function to determine the socially optimal growth path in 
a heterogeneous population. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Problems of economic inequality, wealth disparity, and justice have long been central issues in 
economics and are again a hot topic in the midst of the great recession that began in 2008. The 
concerns of the Occupy Wall Street movement are a recent example. However, the criteria for 
socially optimal allocation have not been universally agreed upon because of utility’s 
interpersonal incomparability, Arrow’s general possibility theorem (Arrow, 1951), and other 
factors. Although the problem of utility’s interpersonal incomparability was solved by Bergson 
(1938) and Samuelson (1947), their idea was fundamentally criticized by Arrow (1951). 
Arrow’s criticism can be worked around if the assumptions in Arrow (1951) are modified, for 
example, the assumption that every individual has a single-peaked preference is added (see e.g., 
Black, 1958); thus, social welfare functions can be used for various analyses. Nevertheless, even 
if social welfare functions can be used, there is no consensus on their shape. Because of this 
limitation, it has been difficult to provide useful information for arguments of social optimality. 
Even though many people have protested that current levels of economic inequality and wealth 
disparity are too large, there is no theoretical basis on which to judge their arguments.  
 To shed light on the arguments, I take a different approach in this paper. I focus not on 
the nature of the social welfare function but instead on the nature of the utility possibility 
frontier, because if the shape of the utility possibility frontier has some special characteristics, 
particularly if it is very constrained by some factors, it may be able to narrow the opportunities 
for a socially optimal allocation, regardless of any differences in the social welfare functions.  
 In particular, this paper examines social optimality in dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population and the condition for the state where all of the optimality conditions 
of all heterogeneous households are satisfied in these models. Intuitively, knowing whether the 
state where all of the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied is 
achieved seems to provide useful information for social optimality, but it is meaningless if we 
use static models because any competitive equilibrium naturally and always achieves this state 
even if the population is heterogeneous. It is also meaningless when dynamic models are used if 
the models use homogeneous populations, because such a state is naturally and always achieved 
and a homogeneous population generates no income inequality or wealth differential. Thus, the 
only remaining type of model to study is a dynamic model with a heterogeneous population. 
However, Becker (1980) showed that, in such models, the magnitudes of income inequality and 
wealth disparity eventually reach the limit; that is, the most patient household eventually will 
own all capital. All of the other households cannot satisfy their optimality conditions and will 
go bankrupt and, as it were, perish when even a very small negative shock occurs unless the 
authority intervenes. Consequently, examining social optimality in a heterogeneous population 
by using dynamic models has been regarded to be a meaningless task. As a result, little attention 
has been paid in the analyses of social optimality to the state where all of the optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied.  
 Harashima (2010, 2012) shows that, in dynamic models with a heterogeneous 
population, there exists a state where all of the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous 
households are satisfied (i.e., “sustainable heterogeneity”), although this state is not guaranteed 
to be naturally and always achieved, and it is influenced by the behavior of the most advantaged 
household. Even though it is not naturally achievable, it can be always achieved with 
appropriate government intervention. The existence of this state is very important because, 
unlike the case with static and dynamic models with homogeneous populations, we can obtain 
additional meaningful and useful information about social optimality. Dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population have another advantage—they describe the nature of economy far 
more realistically than static and dynamic models with homogeneous populations. Because little 
attention has been given to sustainable heterogeneity in analyses of social optimality, 
discoveries derived from such analyses add a new analytical tool and may help solve the 
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previously discussed problem of the unspecifiability of social optimality. In this paper, the 
endogenous growth model in Harashima (2012) is modified to an exogenous growth model (a 
Ramsey type growth model), and social optimality is examined based on this modified model in 
the same manner as Harashima (2012).  
 A distinct feature of the models presented in this paper and Harashima (2012) is that a 
common nature of utility across the population is assumed to exist as a result of human 
evolution. Although utility functions are different across a population, some common features 
have been assumed, for example, a diminishing marginal rate of substitution. In this paper, an 
additional common nature is assumed such that extreme disutility is generated if all of the 
optimality conditions are not satisfied. The reason for this assumption, as described in more 
detail in Section 5, is that only humans who have this nature could have survived the process of 
natural selection. This additional common nature of utility plays an important role in the 
analyses of social optimality presented in this paper. 
 The model shows that sustainable heterogeneity is the unique socially optimal 
allocation for almost all generally usable (i.e., preferences are complete, transitive, and 
continuous) social welfare functions. This result is very important because the socially optimal 
allocation is uniquely determined without having to specify the shape of the social welfare 
function. This result therefore implies that, with the additional information provided by 
sustainable heterogeneity in dynamic models with a heterogeneous population, the problem of 
unspecifiability of social optimality can be solved.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a multi-economy endogenous growth 
model with heterogeneous population is constructed, and sustainability of heterogeneity is 
examined by using it. The existence of a unique balanced growth path on which all optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied is shown. In Section 3, the endogenous 
model is degenerated to an exogenous growth model. The similar results as the endogenous 
growth model are obtained. Section 4 shows that sustainable heterogeneity is always achievable 
with appropriate government intervention even if the most advantaged household behaves 
unilaterally. In Section 5, extreme disutility to unsustainable heterogeneity is examined based on 
the gene theory of evolution. Section 6 introduces a utility possibility frontier and social welfare 
function modified to dynamic models and shows that sustainable heterogeneity represents the 
unique socially optimal allocation. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 7. 
 
2  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY  
IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL 
 
2.1  The model 
2.1.1  The base model 
2.1.1.1  Production of technologies 
Outputs Yt are the sum of consumption Ct, the increase in capital, and the increase in technology 
such that 
 
 
tttt AνKCY
   . 
 
Thus, 
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t
t
ttt kn
L
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
  , 
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where  0ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 1ν  of a unit of At are equivalent; that is, they 
are produced using the same quantities of inputs (capital, labor, and technology). This means 
that technologies are produced with capital, labor, and technology in the same way as consumer 
goods and services and capital. Unlike most idea-based growth models, no special mechanism is 
required for the production of technology because endogenous balanced growth (i.e., constant 
t
t
k
A
) is not materialized by any special property of the production function of technology but by 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers and arbitrage between investments in capital and 
technology. 
 Because balanced growth paths are the focal point of this paper, Harrod-neutral 
technical progress is assumed.
1
 Hence, the production function is  αtt
α
tt LAKY


1
; thus, 
 
 
α
t
α
tt kAy


1
 . 
 
It is assumed for simplicity that the population growth rate (nt) is constant and not negative such 
that nt = n ≥ 0. 
 
2.1.1.2  Substitution between investments in Kt and At 
For any period,  
 
 
  

m 
Mt
Lt
 ,                                (1) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms (which are assumed to be identical) and m (> 0) is a constant. 
Equation (1) presents a natural assumption that the population and number of firms are 
proportional to each other. Equation (1) therefore indicates that any firm consists of the same 
number of employee regardless of Lt. Note that, unlike the arguments in Young (1998), Peretto 
(1998), Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Mt is not implicitly 
assumed to be proportional to the number of sectors or researchers in the economy (see also 
Jones, 1999). Equation (1) merely indicates that the average number of employees per firm in an 
economy is independent of the population. Hence, Mt is not essential for the amount of 
production of At. As will be shown by equations (2) and (3), production of At does not depend 
on the number of researchers but on investments in technology. In contrast, Mt plays an 
important role in the amount of uncompensated knowledge spillovers.  
 The constant m implicitly indicates that the size of a firm is, on average, unchanged 
even if the population increases. This assumption can be justified by Coase (1937) who argued 
that the size of a firm is limited by the overload of administrative information. In addition, 
Williamson (1967) argued that there can be efficiency losses in larger firms (see also Grossman 
and Hart, 1986 and Moore, 1992). Their arguments equally imply that there is an optimal firm 
size that is determined by factors that are basically independent of population.  
 Next, for any period,  
 
 t
t
ρ
tt
t
νA
Y
MK
Y





1

 ;                          (2) 
 
                                                          
1 As is well known, only Harrod-neutral technological progress matches the stylized facts presented by Kaldor 
(1961). As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) argue, technological progress must take the labor-augmenting form in the 
production function if the models are to display a steady state.  
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thus,  
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1

                             (3) 
 
is always kept, where  1  and  10  ρρ  are constants. The parameter ρ describes the 
effect of uncompensated knowledge spillovers, and the parameter   indicates the effect of 
patent protection. With patents, incomes are distributed not only to capital and labor but also to 
technology. For simplicity, the patent period is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital 
depreciation is assumed.  
 Equations (2) and (3) indicate that returns on investing in capital and technology for 
the investing firm are kept equal. The driving force behind the equations is that firms exploit all 
opportunities and select the most profitable investments at all times. Through arbitrage, this 
behavior leads to equal returns on investments in capital and technology. With substitution 
between investments in capital and technology, the model exhibits endogenous balanced growth. 
Because   αt
α
t
α
t
α
tρ
ρ
t
t
t
t
t kAαkA
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k
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y
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1
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, 
  tρ
ρ
t
t k
ανm
αL
A


 11

 by equations (1) 
and (2), which lucidly indicates that 
t
t
k
A
= constant, and the model can therefore show balanced 
endogenous growth. 
 
2.1.1.3  Uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
Equations (2) and (3) also indicate that the investing firm cannot obtain all of the returns on its 
investment in technology. That is, although investment in technology increases Yt, the investing 
firm’s returns are only a fraction of the increase in Yt, such that  t
t
ρ
t νA
Y
M 

1

, because 
knowledge spills over to other firms without compensation and other firms possess 
complementary technologies.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (MAR externalities: Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 
1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (Jacobs externalities: Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory 
assumes that knowledge spillovers between homogenous firms are the most effective and that 
spillovers will primarily emerge within sectors. As a result, uncompensated knowledge 
spillovers will be more active if the number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, 
Jacobs (1969) argues that knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice 
different activities and that diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is more important in 
influencing spillovers. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if 
the number of sectors in the economy is larger. If all sectors have the same number of firms, an 
increase in the number of firms in the economy results in more knowledge spillovers in any case, 
as a result of either MAR or Jacobs externalities. 
 As uncompensated knowledge spillovers increase, the investing firm’s returns on 
investment in technology decrease. 
t
t
A
Y


 indicates the total increase in Yt in the economy by an 
increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs of the firm that invested in the new 
technologies and outputs of other firms that utilize the newly invented technologies, regardless 
of whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm or through 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms increases and uncompensated 
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knowledge spillovers increase, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing firm can 
obtain becomes smaller, as do its returns on the investment in technology. The parameter ρ 
describes the magnitude of this effect. If ρ = 0, the investing firm’s returns are reduced at the 
same rate as the increase of the number of firms. 10  ρ  indicates that the investing firm’s 
returns diminish as the number of firms increase but not to the same extent as when ρ = 0. 
 Both types of externalities predict that uncompensated knowledge spillovers will 
increase as the number of firms increases, and scale effects have not actually been observed 
(Jones, 1995a), which implies that scale effects are almost canceled out by the effects of MAR 
and Jacobs externalities. Thus, the value of ρ is quite likely to be very small. From the point of 
view of a firm’s behavior, a very small ρ appears to be quite natural. Because firms intrinsically 
seek profit opportunities, newly established firms work as hard as existing firms to profit from 
knowledge spillovers. An increase in the number of firms therefore indicates that more firms are 
trying to obtain the investing firm’s technologies.  
 Because of the non-rivalness of technology, all firms can equally benefit from 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers, regardless of the number of firms. Because the size of 
firms is independent of population and thus constant as argued in Section 2.1.1.2, each firm’s 
ability to utilize the knowledge that has spilled over from each of the other firms will not be 
reduced by an increase in population. In addition, competition over technologies will increase as 
the number of firms increases, and any firm will completely exploit all opportunities to utilize 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers as competition increases.
2
 Hence, it is quite likely that the 
probability that a firm can utilize a unit of new technologies developed by each of the other 
firms without compensation will be kept constant even if the population and the number of 
firms increase. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will increase eventually to the 
point that they increase at the same rate as the increase in the number of firms. 
 The investing firm’s fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that it can obtain will thereby be reduced at the 
same rate as the increase in the number of firms, which means that ρ will naturally decrease to 
zero as a result of firms’ profit-seeking behavior. Based on ρ = 0, 
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t
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t
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Y
MK
Y




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                             (4) 
 
by equations (2) and (3); thus,  
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mνk
y




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                              (5) 
 
is always maintained. 
 Complementary technologies also reduce the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing firm 
can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with other technologies, the 
returns on investment in the new technology will belong not only to the investing firm but also 
to the firms that possess the other technologies. For example, an innovation in computer 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
                                                          
2 Moreover, a larger number of firms indicates that firms are more specialized. More specialized and formerly 
neglected technologies may become valuable to the larger number of specialized firms. Hence, knowledge spillovers 
will increase. 
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computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that possess complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y


 leaks to these firms, 
and the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue that unexpectedly became obtainable because of 
the original firm’s innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. 
Because of both complementary technologies and uncompensated knowledge spillovers, the 
fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that an investing firm can obtain on average will be very small; that is,   
will be far smaller than Mt except when Mt is very small.
3
 
 
2.1.1.4  The optimization problem 
Because 
  tt
k
αmν
α
A


1

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t
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 As a whole, the optimization problem of the representative household is to maximize 
the expected utility 
 
   dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
 
 
subject to equation (6) where u(•) is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function 
and E is the expectation operator. 
 
2.1.2  A model with heterogeneous households 
Heterogeneous time preference is examined in an endogenous growth model, which is a 
modified version of the model shown in Section 2.1.1 (See Harashima (2012) for other 
heterogeneities―risk aversion and productivity). First, suppose that there are two economies― 
economy 1 and economy 2—that are identical except for time preference. The population 
growth rate is zero (i.e., 0tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, 
services, and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each 
economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
                                                          
3 If Mt is very small, the value of   will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to the very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation cannot be fully 
realized. This constraint can be modeled as   tM1~11~   , where  1~   is a constant. Nevertheless, for 
sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such that 
     

~~11~lim 1
t
t
M
M
. 
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economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 In this section, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time 
preference is constructed.
4
 The rate of time preference of the representative household in 
economy 1 is 
1θ  and that in economy 2 is θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The production function in economy 
1 is  tαtt kfAy ,1,1   and that in economy 2 is  tαtt kfAy ,2,2  , where yi,t and ki,t are, 
respectively, output and capital per capita in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2. The population of 
each economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in 
both economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt 
and that in economy 2 is - τt. Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral 
technological progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
 α
ti,
α
ti,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,,   iLAKY
α
tt
α
titi
. 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration such that  
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Equation (7) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that 
 
 t
,t,t
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
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2
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. Therefore, 
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Because equation (7) is always held through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1   and tt yy ,2,1    are also held. Hence, 
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 . 
 
                                                          
4 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous time preference was originally shown by Harashima 
(2009). 
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In addition, because 
   
t
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t
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A
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A
yy
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21
,1
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



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 through arbitration, then tt AA ,2,1
   is 
held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since 






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


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

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,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
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s
t
t
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
0
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,1  and dsτ
k
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s
t
t


0
,2
,2  represent 
income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
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

0
,2
,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
 
t
t
s
t
t
τdsτ
k
y



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,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in 
activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt and it is assumed that gt depends on capitals such that  
 
,tt kgg 1  
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
 
,t,tt kgkgg 21   . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
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t
s
,t
,t
,t
L
Aνkgcτdsτ
k
y
y   ,        (8) 
 
and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
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    dttθcuE t 2
0
,22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
 
1
22
0
1
1
22
2










 
t
,tt,tt
t
s
,t
,t
,t,t
L
Aνgcτdsτ
k
y
yk   
1
222
0
1
1
2
2










 
t
,t,t,tt
t
s
,t
,t
,t
L
Aνkgcτdsτ
k
y
y   ,          (9) 
 
where ui,t, ci,t, and tiA ,
 , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and 
ttt AAA ,2,1
  . Equations (8) and (9) implicitly assume that each economy 
does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because 
 
 t
t
t
kfmν
kfα
A
,1
,1



 
 
 t
t
kfmν
kfα
,2
,2



 and α
i,tkf
 1 , then 
 
  ti,t
k
αmν
α
A


1

 
 
and 
 
   α
α
ti,
ti,
α
mν
α
k
y 








 1
1

 . 
 
Since ,t,t AA 21
   and 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1





, then 
 
   
1
11
0
1
1
11
22










 
tt
,t,tt
t
s
,t
,t
,t,t
LAν
kgcτdsτ
k
y
yk

  
   
  ,tt
,t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
k
αmL
α
kgcτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mv
α
111
0
1
1
1
11 













 
   
 
and 
 
 
 
 
   






















 

,t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
t
t
,t kgcτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
ααmL
αmL
k 11
0
1
11 11
1
1 

  . 
 
Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
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vanishes and thereby 
 
 
1
1
1



ααmL
αmL
t
t

.  
 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
 
    dttθcuEMax ,t 1
0
11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
 
     ,t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t kgcτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 11
0
1
11 11 











 
   . 
 
Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
 
    dttθcuEMax ,t 2
0
22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
 
     ,t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t kgcτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 22
0
1
22 11 











 
   . 
 
2.2  The multilateral path 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. Although the previously discussed state of 
Becker (1980) is Pareto efficient, by this definition, the heterogeneity is not sustainable because 
only the most patient household can achieve optimality. Sustainability is therefore the stricter 
criterion for welfare than Pareto efficiency. 
 In this section, the growth path that makes heterogeneity sustainable is examined. First, 
the basic natures of the models presented in Section 2.1 when the government does not 
intervene, i.e., 0g  are examined.  
 
2.2.3  Sustainability 
Because balanced growth is the focal point for the growth path analysis, the following analyses 
focus on the steady state such that 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim


, 
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim


, 
t
t
t k
k
,1
,1
lim


, 
t
t
t k
k
,2
,2
lim


, and 
t
t
t 


lim  are 
constants. The balanced growth path in the heterogeneous time preference model has the 
following properties. 
 
Lemma 1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

 constant, 
then 
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
 




 t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
0
0
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlimlimlimlimlim



   . 
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Proposition 1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim


 


t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
 
 The path on which 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

constant has the following properties. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Corollary 1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 

t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim

 


t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, then 
 


t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c 
limlimlimlimlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 constant. 
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is 
 
 







 








 2
1limlim 211
2
2
1
1 θθα
mν
α
ε
c
c
c
c α
α
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t

 .
5
              (10) 
 
Corollary 2: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 

t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim

 


t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, 
 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt
s
t
s
t
t
t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlimlimlimlim





 
                                                          
5 See Harashima (2010) 
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            

t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t A
A
y
y
y
y 
limlimlim
,2
,2
,1
,1 constant.                          
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Because current account imbalances eventually grow at the same rate as output, consumption, 
and capital on the multilateral path, the ratios of the current account balance to output, 
consumption, and capital do not explode, but they stabilize as shown in the proof of Proposition 
1; that is, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t


,2,1
limlim . 
 On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1, 
heterogeneity in time preference is sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. The balanced growth path satisfying 
Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1 is called the “multilateral balanced growth path” or 
(more briefly) the “multilateral path” in the following discussion. The term “multilateral” is 
used even though there are only two economies, because the two-economy models shown can 
easily be extended to the multi-economy models shown in Section 2.2.6.  
 Because technology will not decrease persistently (i.e., 0lim 

t
t
t A
A
), only the case 
such that 0lim 

t
t
t A
A
 (i.e., 0limlim
,2
,2
,1
,1


t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c 
 on the multilateral path by Corollary 1) 
is examined in the following discussion. 
 
2.2.4  The balance of payments 
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t


,2,1
limlim  and 
t
t
s
t k
ds
,1
0
lim



 
1
,1
,1
,2
0
limlim

 









t
t
t
t
t
s
t c
c
Ξ
k
ds 
 on the multilateral path. Because ki,t is positive, if the sign of Ξ 
is negative, the current account of economy 1 will eventually show permanent deficits and vice 
versa. 
 
Lemma 2: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 
 
    
1
1
21121 1
2
11
2



















 













θθ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
θθ
Ξ
α
α
α
α

 . 
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Lemma 2 indicates that the value of Ξ is uniquely determined on the multilateral path, and the 
sign of Ξ is also therefore uniquely determined. 
 
Proposition 2: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0Ξ  if 
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    
2
111 21
θθ
εαα
mν
α α
α






  . 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Proposition 2 indicates that the current account deficit of economy 1 and the current account 
surplus of economy 2 continue indefinitely on the multilateral path. The condition 
    
2
111 21
θθ
εαα
mν
α α
α






   is generally satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 Conversely, the opposite is true for the trade balance. 
 
Corollary 3: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0lim
0
,2
,2











  dsτk
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t
t
 if 
    
2
111 21
θθ
εαα
mν
α α
α






  . 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Corollary 3 indicates that, on the multilateral path, the trade surpluses of economy 1 continue 
indefinitely and vice versa. That is, goods and services are transferred from economy 1 to 
economy 2 in each period indefinitely in exchange for the returns on the accumulated current 
account deficits (i.e., debts) of economy 1. 
 Nevertheless, the trade balance of economy 1 is not a surplus from the beginning. 
Before Corollary 3 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
s0  should be accumulated. In the early periods, 
when dsτ
t
s0  is small, the balance on goods and services of economy 1 ( dsτk
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 


0
,2
,2 ) 
continues to be a deficit. After a sufficient negative amount of dsτ
t
s0  is accumulated, the trade 
balances of economy 1 shift to surpluses. 
 Current account deficit of economy 1 means for example that a firm that is owned by 
economy 1 borrows money from a bank in which economy 2 deposits money. Economy 1 
indirectly borrows money from economy 2. This situation can be easily understood if you see 
the current account deficit of the United States.   
 
2.2.5  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are not 
exclusive. It is particularly likely that heterogeneities in time preference and productivity 
coexist. Many empirical studies conclude that the rate of time preference is negatively 
correlated with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003); this indicates 
that the economy with the higher productivity has a lower rate of time preference and vice versa. 
In this section, the models are extended to include heterogeneity in multiple elements. Suppose 
that there are H economies that are identical except for time preference. Let the degree of 
relative risk aversion of economy i be 
'u
"uc
ε
i
ii,t
i  , the production function of economy i be 
 i,t
α
t
α
ii,t kfAωy  , and tjiτ ,,  be the current account balance of economy i with economy j, 
where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, and i ≠ j. 
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Proposition 3: If and only if  
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ωθ
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c
1
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1
1
1
,
,
1
lim


           (11) 
 
for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied at steady state such that 
ti
ti
t c
c
,
,
lim


, 
ti
ti
t k
k
,
,
lim


, and 
i,j,t
i,j,t
t τ
τ

lim  are constants, and 
 




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sji
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sji
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tji
tji
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dsτd
τ
τ
A
A
y
y
k
k
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c
0
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0
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,
,
,
,
,
,
limlimlimlimlimlim

 
 
for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
Proof: See Harashima (2012) 
 
 Proposition 3 implies that the concept of the representative household in a 
heterogeneous population implicitly assumes that all households are on the multilateral path. 
 
2.3  The unilateral path 
The multilateral path satisfies all the optimality conditions, but that does not mean that the two 
economies naturally select the multilateral path. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that, 
under appropriate assumptions, the results of Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth 
models. Farmer and Lahiri (2005) show that balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a 
multi-agent economy in general, except in the special case that all agents have the same constant 
rate of time preference. How the economies behave in the environments described in Sections 
2.1 and 2.3 when the government does not intervene, i.e., 0g . is examined in this section. 
 The multilateral path is not the only path on which all the optimality conditions of 
economy 1 are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve optimality, but 
economy 2 cannot. 
 
Lemma 3: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to satisfy all the 
optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
 Since    











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

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

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
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 
 
at steady state, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
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That is, 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim


 can be constant only when either equation (12) or (13) is satisfied. Conversely, 
economy 1 has two paths on which all its optimality conditions are satisfied. Equation (12) 
indicates that 

t
t
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τ
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lim constant, and equation (13) indicates that 
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. Equation (12) corresponds to the 
multilateral path. On the path satisfying equation (13), 
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and 
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is required because   α
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. However, because 
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
 , 
economy 2 must initially set consumption such that 02,c , which violates the optimality 
condition of economy 2. Therefore, unlike with the multilateral path, all the optimality 
conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied on the path satisfying equation (13) even though 
those of economy 1 can. Hence, economy 2 has only one path on which all its optimality 
conditions can be satisfied—the multilateral path. The path satisfying equation (13) is called the 
“unilateral balanced growth path” or the “unilateral path” in the following discussion. Clearly, 
heterogeneity in time preference is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
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 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? Possibly, 
both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements may be reached. If 
no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards economy 2’s optimality 
conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not regard the 
optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
The reasoning behind Remark 1 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral path and 
sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The first option is for 
economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding economy 1: that is, to select its 
own unilateral path. The second option is to adapt to the behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If 
economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma 3 
indicates, unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two economies and 
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 and 
tt kk ,2,1   must be kept, capital and technology are 
equal and grow at the same rate in both economies. Hence, because 
0,20,1 cc  , more capital is 
initially produced in economy 1 than in economy 2 and some of it will need to be exported to 
economy 2. As a result, 
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 , which means that all the optimality 
conditions of both economies cannot be satisfied. Since 
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capital soon becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in 
that economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This process 
escalates as time passes because 
t
t
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 , and eventually 
almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are consumed by households in 
economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set c2,0 = ∞ to satisfy all its optimality 
conditions, as the proof of Lemma 3 indicates. Setting c2,0 = ∞ is impossible, but economy 2 as 
the follower will initially set c2,t as large as possible. This action gives economy 2 a higher 
expected utility than that of the first option, because consumption in economy 2 in the second 
case is always higher. As a result, economy 2 imports as many goods and services as possible 
from economy 1, and the trade deficit of economy 2 continues until   t
t
s
α
α
τdsτα
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α
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
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

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is achieved; this is, 
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

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t
s
t
s
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
0
0




 is achieved. The current account deficits and the 
accumulated debts of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. Furthermore, they will 
increase more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
t
t
t y
y
,2
,2
lim


) because, in general, 
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 . If no disturbance occurs, the 
expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes extremely vulnerable to 
even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, economy 2 will lose all its 
capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This result corresponds to the state shown 
by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable for economy 2. Because 
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, inequality (27) holds, and the transversality condition for 
economy 1 is satisfied. Thus, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied if 
economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in any case 
if economy 1 takes the unilateral path. Both options to counter the unilateral behavior of 
economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of economy 2 is 
higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 will choose the second 
option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the debts owed 
by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
3  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY  
IN AN EXOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL 
 
The multilateral paths in the endogenous growth models (heterogeneous time preference, risk 
aversion, and productivity models) shown in Section 2 imply that similar sustainable states exist 
in exogenous growth models. However, this is true only for the heterogeneous time preference 
model, because, in exogenous growth models, the steady state means that θ
k
y
t
t 


; that is, 
the heterogeneity in risk aversion is irrelevant to the steady state, and the heterogeneous 
productivities do not result in permanent trade imbalances due to 
t
t
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y
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
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. Thereby, 
only heterogeneous time preference is relevant to sustainable heterogeneity in exogenous 
growth models. 
 
3.1  The Model 
The endogenous growth model of heterogeneous time preference in Section 2 is degenerated to 
an exogenous growth model. If technology is exogenously given and constant (At = A), 
Hamiltonians for the heterogeneous time preference model shown in Section 2.2.1 degenerate to  
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for economy 1, and 
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for economy 2. 
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3.2  Sustainable heterogeneity 
First, the natures of the model when the government does not intervene, i.e., 0g  are 
examined. The growth rate of consumption in economy 1 is 
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and thereby  
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, and Ψ is constant at steady state because k1,t and τt are constant and 
thus 
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  is constant at steady state. For Ψ to be constant at steady state, it is 
necessary that 0lim 
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τ  and thus 0Ξ . Therefore,  
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By equations (14) and (17),  
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If equation (18) holds, all the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
This result is analogous to equation (29) and corresponds to the multilateral path in the 
endogenous growth models. The state indicated by equation (18) is called the “multilateral 
steady state” or “multilateral state” in the following discussion. By similar procedures as those 
used for the endogenous growth models in Section 2, the condition of multilateral steady state 
for H economies is shown as  
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by equation (18), then, by 0lim
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that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
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in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
 20 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. 
 If both economies are not open and are isolated, 
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 at steady state instead of the conditions shown in equation (18). Hence, at the 
multilateral steady state with 
21 θθ  , the amount of capital in economy 1 is smaller than when 
the economy is isolated and vice versa. As a result, output and consumption in economy 1 are 
also smaller in the multilateral steady state with 
21 θθ   than when the economy is isolated.  
 
3.3  The unilateral state 
In the multilateral state, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, and 
heterogeneity is therefore sustainable. However, this state will be economically less preferable 
for economy 1 as compared with the state of Becker (1980), because consumption is smaller and 
debts are owed. The behaviors of the economies in the environments described in Sections 3.1 
when the government does not intervene, i.e., 0g . is examined in this section. 
 The multilateral state is not the only state on which all the optimality conditions of 
economy 1 are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve optimality, but 
economy 2 cannot. 
 
Lemma 5: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to satisfy all the 
optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Economy 1 has a path that satisfies equation (14) other than equation (17). Even if economy 1 
does not consider the optimality conditions of economy 2 (i.e., economy 1 behaves unilaterally), 
the behavior that satisfies the following condition also makes all the optimality conditions of 
economy 1 satisfied:   
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Equation (19) is easily obtained by transposition in equation (14). By equation (19),  
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If Ψ = 0,  
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which is the familiar condition for steady state in the Ramsey growth model. Economy 1 selects 
one of the two steady states (the multilateral state that satisfies equation [37] and the unilateral 
state that satisfies equation [**2]) at which all its optimality conditions are satisfied.  
 On the path satisfying equation (19), 
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by equations (16) and (19). Because α
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By equation (20),  
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If the economy 1 initially sets its consumption unilaterally so as to make 0lim
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because θ1 < θ2 as assumed in Section 2.1.2. Furthermore, even though Ψ < 0, if  
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21 , the consumption of economy 2 continues to decline indefinitely, i.e., 
c2,t = 0 at steady state while c1,t is positive and constant at steady state. Unless economy 2 
initially sets its consumption such that 02,c , which is however impossible, the optimality 
condition of economy 2 is violated. This is the case Becker (1980) describes.  
 There are various steady states that satisfy equation (19) depending on the value of 
,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
Ψ
1
0
lim


  (i.e., the initial consumption set by economy 1). At any steady state that 
satisfies equation (19), all optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. For economy 1, all 
the steady states are equally optimal. Nevertheless, economy 1 selects one of the steady states 
(in other words, sets a certain value of the initial consumption). For example, it may select the 
one that gives the highest expected utility, the highest steady state consumption, or some values 
of other criteria.  
 Unlike with the multilateral state, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be 
satisfied on the path satisfying equation (19) even though those of economy 1 can. Hence, 
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economy 2 has only one path on which all its optimality conditions can be satisfied—the 
multilateral state. The state satisfying equation (19) is called the “unilateral steady state” or the 
“unilateral state” in the following discussion. Clearly, heterogeneity in time preference is not 
sustainable on the unilateral state. 
 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? Possibly, 
both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements may be reached. If 
no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards economy 2’s optimality 
conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 2: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not regard the 
optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
The reasoning behind Remark 2 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral state and 
sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The first option is for 
economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding economy 1: that is, to select its 
own unilateral state. The second option is to adapt to the behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If 
economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma 5 
indicates, unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two economies and 
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tt kk ,2,1   must be kept, capital and technology are 
equal and grow at the same rate in both economies. Hence, because 
0,20,1 cc  , more capital is 
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economy 2. As a result, 
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conditions of both economies cannot be satisfied. Since 
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capital soon becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in 
that economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This process 
escalates as time passes because 
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 , and eventually 
almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are consumed by households in 
economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set c2,0 = ∞ to satisfy all its optimality 
conditions, as the proof of Lemma 5 indicates. Setting c2,0 = ∞ is impossible, but economy 2 as 
the follower will initially set c2,t as large as possible. This action gives economy 2 a higher 
expected utility than that of the first option, because consumption in economy 2 in the second 
case is always higher. As a result, economy 2 imports as many goods and services as possible 
from economy 1, and the trade deficit of economy 2 continues until   t
t
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 is achieved. The current account deficits and the 
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accumulated debts of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. Furthermore, they will 
increase more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
t
t
t y
y
,2
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lim
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) because, in general, 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c



 limlim
,1
,1 ; that is,      21
1
11 θθα
mν
α
ε
α
α







 . If no disturbance occurs, the 
expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes extremely vulnerable to 
even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, economy 2 will lose all its 
capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This result corresponds to the state shown 
by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable for economy 2. Because 
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, inequality (27) holds, and the transversality condition for 
economy 1 is satisfied. Thus, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied if 
economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in any case 
if economy 1 takes the unilateral state. Both options to counter the unilateral behavior of 
economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of economy 2 is 
higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 will choose the second 
option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the debts owed 
by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
3.4  Doom of the less advantaged economies 
Remark 2 indicate that economy 2’s ratio of debt to consumption continues to increase 
indefinitely on the unilateral state. Such an indefinitely increasing ratio may not matter if there 
is no shock or disturbance. However, if even a very tribunal negative shock occurs, economy 2 
will be ruined because the huge amount of accumulated debts cannot be refinanced. In this case, 
“ruin” means that economy 2 will go bankrupt or be exterminated because its consumption has 
to be zero unless the authority intervenes to some extent (e.g., debt relief after personal 
bankruptcy). Even if economy 2 continues to exist by the mercy of economy 1, it will fall into a 
slave-like state indefinitely without the authority’s intervention.  
 
4  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY WITH 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
 
Sustainable heterogeneity, as described in this paper, is a very different state from what Becker 
(1980) described. The difference emerges because, on a multilateral state, economy 1 behaves 
fully considering economy 2’s situation. The multilateral state therefore will not be naturally 
selected by economy 1, and the path selection may have to be decided politically (Harashima, 
2010). On the other hand, when economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the government may intervene 
in economic activities so as to achieve, for example, social justice.  
 In this section, I show that even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, sustainable 
heterogeneity can always be achieved with appropriate government intervention.   
 
4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Government intervention is first considered in the two-economy model constructed in Section 3. 
If the government intervenes (i.e., 0g ),  
 
 24 
 

 




 t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
c
c
0
0
,1
,1
limlimlim



  . 
 
Because 0g , equations (14) and (15) are changed to ,  
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If economy 1 behaves unilaterally such that equation (21) is satisfied, then  
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At the same time, if economy 2 behaves unilaterally such that equation (22) is satisfied, then  
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By equations (21) and (22) 
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This equation is identical to equation (18) and is satisfied at the multilateral steady state. 
Therefore,  
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If g  is set equal to equation (23), all optimality conditions of both economies 1 and 2 are 
satisfied even though economy 1 behaves unilaterally.   
 There are various values of Ψ depending on the initial consumption economy 1 sets. If 
economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, particularly, make g = 0 such 
that 
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by equation (23). Equation (24) is identical to equation (17), that is, the state where equation 
(24) is satisfied is identical to the multilateral state (with no government intervention, i.e., g = 
0). On the other hand, if economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
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This condition is identical to that for sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention in 
the endogenous growth model shown in Harashima (2012). Furthermore, if economy 1 behaves 
in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, g is positive and given by equation (23). 
 There are various steady states depending on the values of 
,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
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1
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

  and thus 
the initial consumption set by economy 1. Nevertheless, at any steady state that satisfies 
equation (24), all optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied (by government’s 
intervention, all optimality conditions of economy 2 are also satisfied). For economy 1, all 
steady states are equally optimal. Economy 1 selects one of steady states (in other words, set the 
initial consumption), for example, it may select the one that gives the highest expected utility, 
the highest steady state consumption, or some values of other criteria. Note however that too 
large positive Ψ requires zero initial consumption and thus a certain upper bound of Ψ will exist.  
 
4.2  Multi-economy models 
4.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
In this section, only the case of 0lim
1
0



,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
Ψ  is considered for simplicity. As was 
assumed in Section 2, there are H economies that are identical except for time preference. If H = 
2, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined 
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economy (economy 1+2) with twice the population and a rate of time preference of 
2
21 θθ  . 
Suppose there is a third economy with a time preference of θ3. Because economy 1+2 has twice 
the population of economy 3, if 
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By iterating similar procedures, if the government’s transfers between economy H and economy 
1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H).  
 
5  EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF UTILITY 
 
5.1  Genes and utility 
The gene-centered view of evolution indicates that evolution is the result of the differential 
survival of competing genes (see, e.g., Hamilton 1964a; b, Williams, 1966), and the gene is the 
unit of selection. Genes compete to survive, and only genes that “won” the competition have 
survived the evolutionary process by fully utilizing their phenotypic effects. The gene-centered 
view implies that species are governed by an extremely strong desire for the indefinite 
continuation of their genes. Although some mutations may have existed that made an individual 
lack such a desire, such mutations must eventually be exterminated through natural selection. A 
strong desire to survive as a phenotypic effect indicates that humans are extremely motivated to 
avoid of being exterminated.  
 Altruistic behaviors of individuals in a group that shares a common pool of genes may 
be observed, but the gene-centered view implies that the group as a whole will demonstrate an 
extremely strong desire to escape the possibility of being exterminated. Some individuals may 
even die to save the group, but the group will never willingly choose to be destroyed because 
the common pool of genes would be lost.  
 The concept of utility should be consistent with the theory of evolution, and the above 
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arguments indicate that the prospect of being exterminated should produce extreme fear (i.e., 
extreme disutility) in human beings. As Becker (1980) showed, unless sustainable heterogeneity 
is achieved, less advantaged households will perish when even a very small negative shock 
occurs, so the possibility of extinction does occur in dynamic models with a heterogeneous 
population. The possibility of extinction should result in a situation of extreme disutility for 
households in an economy, and human beings are “programmed” to take extreme actions to try 
to escape this result, thereby enabling the common pool of genes to survive. The gene-centered 
view of evolution indicates that the extreme disutility experienced in this situation is a natural 
outcome of evolution.  
 
5.2  Extreme disutility to unsustainable heterogeneity 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 indicate that, on a unilateral state without government intervention, less 
advantaged economies are exterminated or, at best, fall into a slave-like state. The slave-like 
state can be seen as equivalent to being exterminated in the sense that the members of those 
economies are treated more like disposable materials. As discussed in Section 5.1, either 
extermination or living in a slave-like state should generate extreme fear and disutility in 
residents of these economies. Hence, the unilateral state without government intervention will 
generate extreme disutility in the less advantaged economies. 
 Note that households are assumed to live infinitely long in this paper; thus, 
extermination does not mean the death of an individual with a finite lifespan. It is the extinction 
of a dynasty, and in biological terms, indicates that all group members who share a common 
pool of genes perish.  
 It could be argued that being forced to live in a slave-like state does not generate 
extreme disutility because the common pool of genes is preserved. However, the members of 
these economies can be exterminated at will at any time by the most advantaged economy. 
Therefore, such states merely mean that extermination is postponed, and the expectations of 
either being exterminated or falling into in a slave-like state will equally generate extreme 
disutility.  
 
5.3  The utility of being exterminated 
The utility function ui(ci,t) is modified to  
 
  i,ti,ti ,cσu  , 
 
where σi,t takes two values, 1 and 0. σi,t = 0 if economy i is exterminated, and σi,t = 1 if economy 
i is not exterminated (extermination includes falling in a slave-like state). The utility function 
allows negative values of utility. Being exterminated (i.e., σi,t = 0) generates extreme disutility 
such that 
   
  i,ti ,cu 0  
 
for any ci,t; that is, extreme disutility is expressed as infinite disutility. If economy i expects to 
be exterminated in some future period tʹ such that E (σi,t) = 0 for t > tʹ, then 
 
  i,tti ,cσEu  
  
for t > tʹ. If economy i does not expect to be exterminated in the future such that E (σi,t) = 1 for 
any t, then  
 
 28 
    i,tii,tti ,cEu,cσEu 1  . 
 
 Note that infinite disutility may indicate that utility is cardinal. Nevertheless, the 
infinite disutility of  i,ti ,cu 0 expressed here as   i,ti ,cu 0 can be defined by an ordinal 
expression such that  i,ti ,cu 0 is identical for any ci,t, and  
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for any ci,t [e.g.,    ,u,u ii 001  ], where    21 11 i,t,ii,t,i ,cu,cu   when 21 i,t,i,t, cc  . 
 
6  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY AS THE 
UNIQUE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL ALLOCATION 
 
6.1  The utility possibility frontier 
A modified utility possibility frontier is needed for analyses using dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population.  
 
6.1.1  The utility possibility frontier for an endogenous growth model 
Because the model used in this paper is a dynamic one, streams of utilities have to be compared. 
The utility possibility frontier, therefore, does not consist of period-utilities but of discounted 
sums of expected utilities. For simplicity, the two-economy model is used where economy 1 has 
a lower rate of time preference than economy 2. Let  
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be the utility possibility frontier of economies 1 and 2, where σi, t is σ of economy i (= 1, 2) in 
period t and  U~  is a two-dimensional function.  
 The summation of expected period-utilities indicates that period-utilities are cardinal 
over time in an economy. Nevertheless, the discounted sums of expected utilities derived from 
different future paths are not required to be cardinal. They merely express ordinal rankings; for 
example, a higher value of    



0
exp1
t
ii,ti dttθ,cuE simply means that economy i prefers the 
path that leads to the higher value over another path with a lower value, and 
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for any ci,t if E (σi,t) = 0 for t > tʹ (    



0
, exp
t
ii,ttii dttθ,cσuE is expressed here as -∞ in this 
case). In addition, comparability of utilities among different economies is not required; that is, 
the utilities of economies 1 and 2 do need not to be comparable in this model. Note however 
that although an ordinal expression is possible, a cardinal expression is used for simplicity in the 
following examinations.  
 As shown in Section 3, the value of ψ indicates the degree of unilateral behavior of 
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economy 1. 
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 indicates that economy 1 selects the multilateral state.  
Conversely, if economy 1 selects the most extreme unilateral state, ψ takes its upper bound 
value. Let
ti,ψ,c be the consumption of economy i (= 1, 2) corresponding to a given degree of 
unilateral behavior of economy 1 (ψ). The points on the utility possibility frontier that achieve 
sustainable heterogeneity are expressed by 
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6.1.2  The shape of the utility possibility frontier 
The analyses in Sections 2 and 3 indicate that the points on the utility possibility frontier that 
achieve sustainable heterogeneity consist only of the curve segment AB in Figure 1. Point A 
indicates the multilateral state, and point B indicates the upper bound of the unilateral state with 
appropriate government intervention. As the degree of unilateral behavior of economy 1 (ψ) 
continuously moves, unilateral states with government’s intervention continuously move and 
thus curve segment AB is continuous. Whether the curve segment AB slopes downward or 
upward is not important for the results shown below. The results depend not on the direction but 
on the monotonicity of the curve segment, that is, the monotonous relationship between ψ and 
   



0
exp1
t
it,i,ψi dttθc,uE . 
 The government’s responses to the unilateral behaviors of economy 1, by which 
sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, are very limited—only responses corresponding to 
unilateral states that are chosen. Given a degree of unilateral behavior of economy 1 (i.e., given 
a value of ψ), only one government response, which is indicated by equation (25), 
correspondingly can successfully achieve sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore only one point 
on curve segment AB consists of the utility possibility frontier for any given value of ψ.  
 For simplicity, the possibility of too much government intervention is not considered, 
and g never exceeds the value for sustainable heterogeneity. Hence, all other responses result in 
a disutility of −∞ for economy 2 because it expects to be exterminated in future such that  
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after a finite period of time; thus, 
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The utility possibilities of such unsustainable heterogeneity for all values of ψ are depicted by 
the line CD in Figure 1. Given a value of ψ, a part of the line CD correspondingly consists of 
the utility possibility frontier of unsustainable heterogeneity. Let such part of the line CD be 
“the line C(ψ)D(ψ),” where point C(ψ) indicates the insufficient intervention that gives the 
smallest discounted sum of expected utility of economy 1 and point D(ψ) indicates the 
insufficient intervention that gives the largest. Each point on the line C(ψ)D(ψ) has a 
corresponding value of g , all of which are insufficient to achieve sustainable heterogeneity for 
the given ψ. 
 As a result, given a degree of unilateral behavior of economy 1 (i.e., given a value of 
ψ), the utility possibility frontier is composed of the two parts: a point on the curve segment AB 
and the line C(ψ)D(ψ).  
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6.2  The social welfare function 
Here, a social welfare function is assumed to be adopted by the society consisting of the all 
economies. The assumptions in Arrow (1951) are modified (e.g., the assumption that every 
individual has a single-peaked preference is added). The social welfare function that is defined 
on the same space as the utility possibility frontier is  
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where  W~ is a two-dimensional function and W is a variable. Its shape is not specified but it 
at least satisfies the following typical features: completeness, transitivity, and continuity. Thus, 
its indifference curves do not cross and are sloping downward to the right. The social welfare 
function’s indifference curves are either convex or concave to the origin. In addition, on any 
indifference curve, as ci,t → 0 for any t, ci,t → ∞ for any t (i ≠ j). I call this type of social welfare 
function a “general type social welfare function.” 
 Next, suppose a continuous function such that  
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defined on the same space as the utility possibility frontier is. Points satisfying this function are 
indicated by  21,vv , where 0
1
2 
dv
dv
and v2 = 0 when v1 = 0, as shown as the dotted line in 
Figure 2. The indifference curve that crosses the function   0~ V at point  21,vv  is  
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 Suppose another type of social welfare function such that, for any point  21,vv , 
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is, the indifference curves are vertical if     2
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, as shown as the 
solid lines in Figure 2. I call this type of social welfare function a “Nietzsche type social welfare 
function.” This type of social welfare function is completely different from the general type 
social welfare function because it does not possess the nature that as ci,t → 0 for any t, ci,t → ∞ 
for any t (i ≠ j) on any indifference curve. The Nietzsche type social welfare function may be 
loathed by many people because it indicates that a society should not care about its members 
being exterminated and does not exclude the social preference that only the strongest should 
prevail. Although a few people may support the Nietzsche type social welfare function, the 
probability of violent political conflicts will become extremely high if a society adopts it (see 
Harashima, 2010).  
 
6.3  The almost unique socially optimal allocation 
The socially optimal state is given by the point where the utility possibility frontier and an 
indifference curve of the social welfare function come in contact with each other. As shown in 
Section 6.1, however, the utility possibility frontier’s shape is not simple. Given a degree of 
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unilateral behavior of economy 1, it is composed of a point on the curve segment AB and the 
line C(ψ)D(ψ). 
 Given a value of ψ, let the corresponding point on the curve segment AB be indicated 
by (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ). Let also W(ς) be W of the indifference curve that crosses the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ), and 
(γ1,W(ς), γ2,W(ς)) indicate points on the indifference curve W(ς). In addition, let the point D(ψ) be 
indicated by (δ1, δ2), W(δ) be W of the indifference curve that crosses the point D(ψ), and (γ1,W(δ), 
γ2,W(δ)) indicate points on the indifference curve W(δ). As argued in Sections 5.3 and 6.1.1, δ2 is 
expressed as -∞. 
 Because of the nature of the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ), the following 
proposition is self-evident. 
 
Proposition 4: If the social welfare function is a general type and its indifference curves are 
convex to the origin, then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal.  
 
Because it is highly likely that social welfare functions in most societies are general type 
functions and their indifferent curves are convex to the origin, Proposition 4 indicates that 
generally the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is uniquely socially optimal. 
 I next examine social optimality when the social welfare function’s indifference 
curves are concave to the origin. 
 
Lemma 6: If the social welfare function is a general type and its indifference curves are 
concave to the origin, then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. 
Proof: Because the social welfare function is a general type and its indifference curves are 
concave to the origin, then γ1,W(ς) > ς1,ψ if γ2,W(ς) < ς2,ψ, and as γ1,W(ς) becomes larger, γ2,W(ς) 
becomes smaller. Let γ2,W(ς), D be γ2,W(ς) when γ1,W(ς) = δ1. Because the social welfare function is 
not a Nietzsche type, then γ2,W(ς), D > δ2 = −∞. Therefore, W(ς) > W(δ). Because the values of W 
of the indifference curves that cross any other point on the line C(ψ)D(ψ) than the point D(ψ) 
are less than W(δ), then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal.                            ■ 
 
Lemma 6 shows that even though the social welfare function’s indifference curves are concave 
to the origin, the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is uniquely determined to be 
socially optimal if the social welfare function is a general type.  
 Next, I examine social optimality when the social welfare function is a Nietzsche type. 
Let (v1,W(ς), v2,W(ς)) be (v1, v2) on the indifference curve W(ς). When the social welfare function is 
Nietzsche type, then γ1,W(ς) ≤ v1,W(ς), where γ1,W(ς) < v1,W(ς) if γ2,W(ς) > v2,W(ς) and γ1,W(ς) = v1,W(ς) if 
γ2,W(ς)≤ v2,W(ς). 
 
Lemma 7: If the social welfare function is a Nietzsche type, and  
(a) if v1,W(ς) < δ1, then only the point (δ1, δ2) is optimal,  
(b) if v1,W(ς) > δ1, then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal, and  
(c) if v1,W(ς) = δ1, then only the points (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) and (δ1, δ2) are optimal.  
Proof: Because the social welfare function is a Nietzsche type and thus its indifference curves 
are concave to the origin, then δ1 = γ1,W(δ) and if γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, then v1,W(ς) = γ1,W(ς). Hence, the 
following statements apply. 
(a) If v1,W(ς) < δ1, then γ1,W(ς) < γ1,W(δ) for γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, and thus W(ς) < W(δ). Because the 
values of W of the indifference curves that cross any other point on the line C(ψ)D(ψ) than the 
point D(ψ) are less than W(δ), then only the point (δ1, δ2) is optimal. 
(b) If v1,W(ς) > δ1, then γ1,W(ς) > γ1,W(δ) for γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, and thus W(ς) > W(δ). By the same 
reason as the latter part of (a), only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. 
(c) If v1,W(ς) = δ1, then γ1,W(ς) = γ1,W(δ) for γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, and thus W(ς) = W(δ). Again, by the 
same reason as the latter part of (a), only points (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) and (δ1, δ2) are optimal.          ■ 
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Lemma 7 indicates that Nietzsche type social welfare functions are distinguished into the 
following three categories. 
Category (i): only point (δ1, δ2) is socially optimal (corresponding to the case v1,W(ς) < δ1). 
Category (ii): only point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is only socially optimal (corresponding to the case v1,W(ς) > 
δ1).  
Category (iii): only points (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) and (δ1, δ2) are socially optimal (corresponding to the case 
v1,W(ς) = δ1). 
 
Proposition 5: If the social welfare function is either a general or Nietzsche type, the point (ς1,ψ, 
ς2,ψ) is only socially optimal allocation for any social welfare function except categories (i) and 
(iii) Nietzsche type social welfare functions, 
Proof: First, by Proposition 4, if the social welfare function is a general type and its indifferent 
curves are convex to the origin, the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. Second, by Lemma 6, if the 
social welfare function is a general type and its indifferent curves are concave to the origin, the 
point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. Finally, by Lemma 7 
, if the social welfare function is a category (ii) Nietzsche type, the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal, 
whereas if it is either a category (i) or (iii) Nietzsche type, the point (δ1, δ2) can be socially 
optimal.                                                                    ■ 
 
 Proposition 5 is important because it indicates that, for almost all generally usable (i.e., 
preferences are complete, transitive, and continuous) social welfare functions, the point of 
sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is the only socially optimal allocation. In addition, it is 
highly likely that very few people actually support category (i) or (iii) Nietzsche type social 
welfare functions because they will generate violent political conflicts (see Harashima, 2010), 
and they will almost certainly always be in the minority. Hence these types of welfare functions 
will be rarely adopted in democratic societies where policies are decided by majority.
6
 In other 
words, category (i) or (iii) Nietzsche type social welfare functions would only be adopted by a 
democratic society when its economic and social situations were extraordinary abnormal. If the 
situation is not extraordinarily abnormal, category (i) and (iii) Nietzsche type social welfare 
functions can be excluded, and we can assert that for any generally usable social welfare 
function, the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is uniquely socially optimal. 
 Proposition 5 provides a clue to solve an important problem in studies of social 
welfare, that is, the unspecifiability of socially optimal allocation resulting from the difficulty in 
specifying the shape of the social welfare function. Proposition 5 escapes this problem because 
the socially optimal allocation is uniquely determined no matter the shape of the social welfare 
function. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to form a specific social ordering to determine the 
socially optimal growth path in a heterogeneous population.  
 
7  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Historically, it has been difficult to universally agree upon a criterion for socially optimal 
allocation because of utility’s interpersonal incomparability, Arrow’s general possibility 
theorem, and other factors. This paper examined social optimality in dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population and showed that a state exists in which all of the optimality conditions 
of a heterogeneous population are satisfied. The existence of such a state provides us with 
additional meaningful information for studying social optimality.  
 The endogenous growth model in Harashima (2012) shows that sustainable 
heterogeneity, which is defined as the state at which all optimality conditions of all 
                                                          
6 As shown in Section 6.2, it is assumed that the assumptions in Arrow (1951) are modified. 
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heterogeneous households are satisfied, is uniquely determined to be the socially optimal 
allocation for almost all generally usable social welfare functions. The exogenous growth model 
in this paper shows the same result. The only exceptions are some variants of a Nietzsche type 
social welfare function, which will rarely be adopted in democratic societies unless the 
economic and social situations are extraordinarily abnormal. Sustainable heterogeneity is 
achievable even if the most advantaged household behaves unilaterally if the government 
appropriately intervenes. The uniquely determined socially optimal allocation in a 
heterogeneous population can be accomplished without specifying the shape of the social 
welfare function, and therefore, the problem of unspecifiability of social optimality can be 
solved.  
 Sustainable heterogeneity as the unique socially optimal allocation will have important 
implications to currently passionately disputed issues such as the Occupy Wall Street movement, 
anti-globalization (e.g., Klein, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002), anti-market fundamentalism (e.g., Gray, 
1998; Stiglitz, 2002, 2009; Soros, 2008), and true measures of happiness (e.g., Sen, 1976; Arrow 
et al., 1995). In addition, sustainable heterogeneity will provide additional theoretical 
foundations for debt relief, wealth taxes, progressive taxation, and international aid. On the 
other hand, sustainable heterogeneity also indicates that there is a unique sustainable level of 
inequality in consumption. 
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Figure 1 The utility possibility frontiers of sustainable and unsustainable 
heterogeneity 
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Figure 2 Indifference curves of a Nietzsche type social welfare function 
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